

Negotiating Novel Diplomacies: Subnational Diplomacy Between US States and Taiwan During the Tsai Ing-wen Administration

Andrew Soohwan Kim and Young Nam Cho

This paper analyzes the phenomenon of subnational diplomacy or paradiplomacy between US state governments and Taiwan, focusing on recent developments that coincided with the consequential period of Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen administration (2016-2024). First, a comprehensive survey of relevant discussions and literature regarding the concept of subnational diplomacy is presented. Two questions are then addressed: whether subnational diplomacy during this period demonstrated continuity or discontinuity with past instances of such paradiplomacy and what factors in high and low politics drove such developments in subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan. Regarding these questions, this paper demonstrates how such subnational diplomacy has indeed undergone quantitative and qualitative change during the Tsai presidency, increasing both in terms of volume and politicization due to the shifting political environments of Taiwan and the United States. Finally, in relation to the latter point of politicization, the theoretical utility of the concepts of "protodiplomacy" and "counter-paradiplomacy" (CPD) in analysis of this topic is also discussed, with the former concept used to describe Taiwan's interactions at the subnational level with US states and the latter used to categorize China's reactive strategies towards such instances of paradiplomacy, respectively.

Keywords subnational diplomacy/paradiplomacy, counter-paradiplomacy (CPD), protodiplomacy, Tsai Ing-wen, US-Taiwan relations

Andrew Soohwan Kim received his Master of International Studies as valedictorian of the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. Email: joseon500@snu.ac.kr

Young Nam Cho is a professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. Email: yncho@snu.ac.kr

Article Received: 2024-10-02, Revised: 2025-04-30, Accepted: 2025-05-15

INTRODUCTION

President Tsai Ing-wen's second and final presidential term ended on May 20, 2024, with Tsai having been succeeded by her partisan compatriot and vice president Lai Ching-te. Her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration, just the second in Taiwanese political history after the maverick Chen Shui-bian administration, presided over rapid shifts within the triangular relational paradigm of the US, the People's Republic of China (hereafter referred to as the "PRC" or "China"), and the Republic of China Taiwan (hereafter referred to as the "ROC Taiwan" or "Taiwan"). Regarding cross-strait relations, the Tsai-era saw an increasing straining of relations, marked by increasingly belligerent rhetoric on the part of China.

For example, in 2019, following a drubbing of the DPP in the 2018 local elections, Xi Jinping revived an antiquated epistolary medium previously reserved for such epoch-making events as the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1979 establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China to present his "5 points" (*Xi-wutiao*), Xi's own iterative reshuffling of the Taiwan doctrines of his predecessors (i.e., Deng Xiaoping's 6 points, Jiang Zemin's 8 points, and Hu Jintao's 6 points) (Grano, 2023). Emerging from this synthesization of the ideations of previous leaders were Xi's emphasis on a perceived historical brotherhood, the "one country, two systems" formula, and the possible use of force in effectuating the "great trend of history" constituted by reunification (Xi, 2019).

Likewise, China's recent utilization of the "two centennial goals" (*liang ge yibai nian fendou mubiao*) within Xi Jinping's latest version of a "three-step development strategy" (*san bu zou fazhan zhanlue*) for military modernization across 2027, 2035, and 2049, combined with CIA Director William Burns' 2023 CBS interview, which seemed to confirm the speculation of some academics that Xi Jinping had set 2027 as a preparatory deadline for an invasion of Taiwan, fuel concerns that an imminent military solution for Xi's stated priority of reunification might be a real possibility (Hadano, 2022; Yen, 2023; Hart, Glaser, and Funaiole, 2021). Despite the fact that Xi Jinping has reportedly denied such set timelines for a military operation against Taiwan and the fact that an overwhelming majority of China experts polled by CSIS in 2022 believed that a short-term attack will not be forthcoming, many analysts (per a more recent CSIS poll) assessed that, at a minimum, quarantines and blockades of Taiwan constitute likely courses of action for Beijing, an assessment borne out in the actual escalation of force projection against Taiwan by China seen during the Tsai administration (Everington, 2023; Dominguez, 2024).

Conversely, Taiwan's Tsai has voiced opposition to both the "92 Consensus" and the possibility of a "one country, two systems" outcome and has reaped the political benefits of her steadfast opposition to changes in the cross-strait status quo or revisions of Taiwan's political *modus operandi*, having won two landslide victories with these policy stances in 2016 and 2020. The reproducibility of her formula of de-facto safeguarding Taiwanese independence via de-jure advocating for the status quo has been further demonstrated in the electoral mandate, however weakened, received by Lai Ching-te in the 2024 elections, in which the DPP won an unprecedented third presidential election

cycle.

Finally, regarding the third main actor in cross-strait relations, the United States has undergone a well-documented shift in its China policy towards open confrontation, especially during the first Trump administration and the Biden administration which both coincided with Tsai's presidential tenure. Taiwan plays an increasingly important role as an integral constituent of the "first island chain" as well as a key unofficial asset for the US's "hub and spokes" alliance system in the Asia-Pacific, and the issue of Taiwan's survival is cited to be the most intractable issue in US-China relations as well as an essential precondition for US force projection in the region (Green and Talmadge, 2022).

Within this hardening Cold War-esque realignment vis-à-vis cross-strait relations, one prominent prong in Beijing's heightened confrontation against the DPP-led Taiwan and the US's open alignment with *de facto* Taiwanese independence was endemic to the realm of international diplomacy. More specifically, an erstwhile diplomatic truce between China and Taiwan was unilaterally broken by the former during the Tsai administration, leading to the eradication of spaces for Taiwan's international diplomacy, both in terms of relationships with diplomatic interlocuters and participation in international organizations (Xin 2020, 540-541). This "international space competition" has been waged through the entirety of the Tsai administration, with the most recent casualty for Taiwan being the Micronesian island state of Nauru, which switched its recognition of the ROC to recognition of the PRC just days after Lai Ching-te's election.

In light of this rising diplomatic contestation seen during the Tsai administration, this paper analyzes an aspect of diplomacy involving Taiwan that has heretofore been largely overlooked in academic commentary: diplomatic relations (i.e., subnational diplomacy or paradiplomacy) between Taiwan and subnational governments. This paper thus analyzes the phenomenon of subnational diplomacy, contributing to the existing literature by narrowing the scope of analysis to subnational diplomacy between Taiwan and individual US states (in particular the state governments of such US states) during the consequential period of the Tsai administration (2016-2024).¹ US state governments are chosen as, despite the US's integral role within the relational triangle of cross-strait relations, its federal government (and especially the federal executive branch) is precluded from official relations with Taiwan since 1979.

The first part of this paper situates the case study of Taiwan and US states within the larger theoretical discussions regarding paradiplomacy in international politics. This paper then addresses two questions: whether subnational diplomacy during the Tsai administration demonstrated continuity or discontinuity with past instances of paradiplomacy, and what factors of high and low politics drove such uses of subnational diplomacy. Regarding these questions, it demonstrates how subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan has indeed undergone quantitative and qualitative

¹ As shown in the following section, subnational diplomacy or paradiplomacy is used to describe diplomacy involving a subnational actor(s). The focus of this paper is diplomacy conducted between the national-level DPP government of Taiwan, a *de-facto* country, and US states, subnational-level units of the United States. Other combinations that can also be described as subnational diplomacy (e.g., between Taiwanese local governments and US state governments, between Taiwanese local governments and the US federal government, etc.) are outside the purview of this paper.

change during the Tsai Ing-wen administration, increasing both in terms of volume and politicization due to the shifting political environments of Taiwan and the United States.

Finally, in relation to the latter point of politicization, a typology of Tsai-era paradiplomacy is presented in which the theoretical utility of the concepts of “protodiplomacy” and “counter-paradiplomacy” (CPD) in categorizing the recent paradiplomatic behavior discussed in this paper is analyzed. The typology delineates a categorization of paradiplomatic behavior by motives of “high politics” using the specific case of subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan as well as China’s reactive strategies towards such instances of paradiplomacy. Overall, this paper contributes to existing scholarship by providing an overview of paradiplomacy between US states and Taiwan during the last DPP administration (which coincided with sea changes in cross-strait and global politics), focusing on the most recent developments missing scholarly analysis.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: SUBNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND THE CASE OF TAIWAN AND US STATES

In academic discourse, “subnational diplomacy” is broadly used to refer to instances of diplomacy, foreign policy, and international relations involving a subnational actor(s), the “subnational” in turn referring to public authorities at the regional level, below the sovereign state (Aldecoa and Keating 2013, viii). The more common term found in pertinent literature is the term “paradiplomacy,” which has been used in the most recent examples of theoretical scholarship on the topic (Kuznetsov, 2015; Tavares, 2016; Schiavon, 2019). The terminological genesis of “paradiplomacy” has been traced to the seminal research of Duchacek and Soldatos (Paquin 2019, 49), with the latter defining the concept as “a direct continuation, and to varying degrees, from sub-state government, foreign activities” (Soldatos 1990, 34). Given the definitional similarity between the two terms, this paper uses “subnational diplomacy” and “paradiplomacy” interchangeably.

It has been pointed out that subnational diplomacy occurs as the fulfillment of three criteria (Setzer and Anderton, 2019). First, such diplomacy involves subnational governments, which consist of coherent governments in their own rights with authoritative decision-making and significant organizational responsibilities.² Second, these subnational actors operate in an emerging “transnational sphere” marked by interactions amongst traditional state and new non-state actors. Finally, the scope of action afforded by novel subnational diplomacy approximates the purview of traditional diplomacy amongst nation-states in that it engages with and addresses world politics.

Thus, paradiplomacy is inherently political and operates in an international space that is growing per globalization. Oddone points out that current scholarship outlines

² Such subnational governments are contrasted with “local authorities,” which may suggest that the term “subnational diplomacy” might have a narrower focus on state or regional-level governments as opposed to “paradiplomacy,” which encompasses both regional and local-level governments (both terms thus remain applicable to this paper’s analysis of US states).

five main motives for paradiplomacy: economic, cultural, political, altruistic, and cross-border (Oddone, 2023). Political motives are argued to be rarer than the others; however, subnational governments are gaining agency amidst a “fragmentation or segmentation of foreign policy” (Oddone, 2023). Indeed, Lecours argued that paradiplomacy “involves a ‘slice’ of domestic politics projecting itself onto the international scene without the medium of the state” (Lecours 2002, 109).

Within the typology of paradiplomacy, there have been concepts that have been proposed to specifically address the political uses of paradiplomacy. For example, paradiplomacy that takes the form of an “indication of political will” by an entity that “seeks international support for a secessionist process” has been subsumed under the concept of “protodiplomacy” (Cornago 2018, 5-7). Duchacek defines protodiplomacy as the “initiatives and activities of a non-central government abroad that graft a more or less separatist message onto its economic, social, and cultural links with foreign nations” (Duchacek 1986, 240). Obviously, there are similarities between the motives of protodiplomacy (i.e., political secessionism or separatism) and those of Taiwan’s interactions with US states, although there might be definitional controversy regarding which entities constitute the main actors of the former (e.g., “non-central governments” or other political entities such as *de facto* countries, with Taiwan embodying the latter).

Another relevant concept of political paradiplomacy for the Taiwan case (especially with regards to the Tsai era) is the concept of “counter-paradiplomacy” (CPD), which refers to “a state-driven reactive policy aimed at disrupting and sabotaging paradiplomacy” which is “particularly acute in contexts where subnational engagement is incongruent with the interests of the parent state, for example, when the territorial integrity of the latter is challenged by paradiplomacy” (Castan Pinos and Sacramento 2024, 193-194). The authors proposing this new concept presented a typology of CPD cases, with the second type of CPD subsuming the (ex)parent country vs. *de facto* country dynamic that is seen in the case of the PRC and Taiwan. The primary aim of this variant of CPD is argued to be counter-recognition (i.e., the disruption of a *de facto* country’s attempt to “gain recognition from UN member states and membership in international organizations”) (Castan Pinos and Sacramento 2024, 201).

Recognition is an especially salient point for Taiwan as it is linked with the issues of national-level statehood and survival. Although the majority of international lawyers and the requirements for statehood stipulated by the 1933 Montevideo Convention adhere to the declaratory theory of state recognition, which theorizes that recognition by other states is not a prerequisite for statehood, it has been pointed out in international legal scholarship that the constitutive theory (i.e., the view that recognition is an essential criterion of statehood) might be a more accurate description of actual practice (Klabbers 2023, 77-81). In particular, UN membership is crucial, proffering member states with the rights, protections, and obligations of important international treaties (e.g., the UN Charter, UN Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, etc.). With the advent of a global “transnational sphere,” recognition by and participation in international forums are also becoming important, as numerous state and non-state actors participate in the making of global governance and soft law within such forums. As such, the consistent efforts by both DPP presidents such as Chen Shui-bian and Tsai Ing-wen and Kuomintang (KMT) presidents such as Ma Ying-jeou to

include Taiwan in international organizations (and US states' support of such efforts, as outlined below) make sense in light of these recent trends in global diplomacy.

Regarding the specific cases of the United States' and Taiwan's uses of paradiplomacy, the relevant commentary narrows down significantly. Most of these studies deal with the former case, with research of federalism in particular noting the United States of America's unique status as arguably the first nation-state in history to adopt a federal system of government (Fry 2009, 298). Within this federalist system and its titular emphasis on a union of states, key provisions of the Constitution ostensibly limit states' power to conduct foreign relations (e.g., Article 1, Section 10's prohibition on state activities that implicate international affairs, the Supremacy Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, and the Compact Clause, *inter alia*) (Mulligan, 2022). However, subsequent jurisprudence on the issue of states' foreign relations have more narrowly defined the traditional role of Congress to oversee and approve subnational diplomacy, especially in the conclusion of pacts by states with foreign actors (Mulligan 2022, 4). Thus, although the overall picture painted by the principle of federal government supremacy and the prohibition on state law preempting federal law highlights some limits to US subnational diplomacy in principle, lack of actual congressional oversight (as well as the lack of political confrontation between the attitudes of federal and state politicians regarding such emerging valence issues as supporting Taiwan) afford considerable subnational agency in practice. This could apply even to matters of substantial controversy in global politics such as the Taiwan question. For example, following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, US state governments have been involved not just in enforcing federally mandated sanctions but also in fashioning separate state-level sanctions against Russia and China (Ali, 2023).

Specifically regarding the uses of paradiplomacy between US states and Taiwan, Tubilewicz and Omond provide the most directly pertinent analysis of the topic, having fashioned a narrative history of instances of US paradiplomacy with a "divided China" from 1949 (after the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War) to about the year 2020 (post-2000 events are discussed in the penultimate chapter) (Tubilewicz and Omond, 2021). Another study argued that Taiwan uses paradiplomacy as a way to buttress its weak national-level relationship with the US, to foster relationships with potentially influential American politicians, and to continue the performance of diplomacy even without national-level recognition (Newland, 2023). Taiwanese subnational diplomacy is also mentioned in passing within other works covering the topic of paradiplomacy and US state-level diplomacy (Tavares, 2016; McMillan, 2012). Regarding more recent instances of paradiplomacy between US states and Taiwan, scant commentary is supplemented via online articles (Tubilewicz, 2023; Marshall, 2024). Regarding developments across the strait, other writings discuss the use of paradiplomacy from the perspective of the PRC (Liu and Song, 2020; Yan, 2022). The overall picture painted by existing research is that of significant and dynamic agency on the part of US states in their interactions with Taiwan.

Subnational diplomacy between US states and the ROC Taiwan is not new, and it has always been constantly reacting to and inflected by changes in global and domestic politics. Tubilewicz and Omond cites the beginning of such subnational interactions as having occurred soon after the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War, with subnational

intercourse regarding economic issues occurring in earnest with the initiative of such subnational actors as Guam and Illinois in the 1960s (Tubilewicz and Omond 2021, 53). Regarding the paradiplomacy that followed this initial phase, they cite the establishment of US formal recognition of the PRC on the first day of 1979, the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989, and the rise of China with the advent of the 21st century, among others, as major inflection points that influenced subnational interactions. For example, the switching of US recognition from the ROC to the PRC was immediately followed by the establishment of the ROC-US Trade and Investment Forum and the invitation by Taiwan of all US governors to attend its inaugural meeting (Tubilewicz and Omond 2021, 95). Events that engendered negative press in the West regarding China's political system such as the Tiananmen Square massacre, as well as those that engendered positive press of Taiwan's system such as the introduction of democratization and free elections, elicited often bipartisan subnational responses hostile towards China and supportive towards Taiwan. Finally, the rise of China and its economic concomitants are interpreted to be the cause of such developments in subnational relations between US states and Taiwan as the closing of US state-level offices in Taiwan (Tubilewicz and Omond 2021, 210-211).

Overall, one is able to glean from this historical narration a picture of political contestation playing out at the subnational level which is influenced by the larger political dynamics of the triangular relationship among the US, China, and Taiwan. The rise of China presented one dynamic influencing the paradiplomatic landscape, while recent Taiwanese counterefforts to encourage interactions with US states and the initiation of openly anti-China policies by the first Trump administration constituted other potential variables. As shown below, all of these factors, *inter alia*, proved to be influential in determining the content of paradiplomatic relations between US states and Taiwan during the Tsai administration.

GENERAL BACKGROUND OF TSAI-ERA SUBNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Significant political developments underpinned the changes endemic to subnational diplomacy between Taiwan and US states during the Tsai Ing-wen administration. Two major changes can be identified. A first change is the resumption of a diplomatic war between China and Taiwan over national-level diplomatic interlocutors and the concomitant reduction of Taiwan's international diplomatic space. A second development is the sea change in US public opinion regarding China that coincided with the duration of the Tsai administration.

Resumption of a Cross-Strait Diplomatic War and the Reduction of Taiwan's Diplomatic Space

A major development in cross-strait relations during the Tsai Ing-wen administration was the dramatic narrowing of Taiwan's international diplomatic space in the face of a renewed diplomatic assault from Beijing. Taiwan's national-level diplomatic portfolio

compressed significantly after the loss of the US and Japan in the 1970s and suffered a massive symbolic blow by the loss of its oldest and last diplomatic partner in Asia, South Korea, in 1992 (Lee and Liff, 2023). After this time, Taiwan's diplomatic scope was focused by necessity on a collection of regions in Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa.

One analysis of cross-strait relations categorizes DPP presidents as “political entrepreneurs” whose political revisionism pertaining to issues of national identity fostered rapid change in cross-strait relations per the phenomenon of punctuated equilibrium (Hu, 2012). One such revisionist DPP politician, Chen Shui-bian, proposed the “one country on each side” (*yibian yiguo*) concept, following in the strain of the controversial two-state formulation of cross-strait relations (“special state-to-state relations” or *teshude guo yu guo guanxi*) first introduced by his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui. Chen advocated for a referendum on revision of the ROC constitution and the abolishment of the National Unification Council of the ROC. Crucially, Chen also internationalized Taiwan's diplomatic competition with China, in what has been pejoratively referred to by his KMT successor, President Ma Ying-jeou, as “scorched earth diplomacy” (*fenghuo waijiao*) (Office of the President ROC, 2008).

In contrast, during his administration, President Ma Ying-jeou pursued an accommodation strategy vis-à-vis mainland China, featuring emphasis on economic integration with China and resumption of political dialogues to promote mutual confidence-building (Zhang, 2011). Ma backed these efforts up with ideological concepts that better comported with Beijing's view of cross-strait relations (e.g., the “Three No's” and “special bilateral non-state relationship” or *teshu feilianguolun*). Most importantly, his “flexible diplomacy” (*huolu waijiao*) entailed a diplomatic truce which saw Beijing give Taiwan more leeway in its diplomacy, both with national-level partners and international organizations.



Note: Green (white in print version) indicates years of DPP administrations (i.e., Chen Shui-bian, Tsai Ing-wen). Blue (black in print version) represents KMT administrations (Lee Teng-hui, Ma Ying-jeou). Includes the Holy See (Vatican City).

Source: Compiled using news articles.

Figure 1. Taiwan's Formal Diplomatic Partners at the National-Level

However, after Tsai Ing-wen's election, Beijing ended the diplomatic truce a half-year into the new DPP presidency. Tsai's rhetorically ambiguous stances on national identity (e.g., the "Four No's," the "Three New Ideas," and portmanteau use of the joint term "ROC Taiwan") still ran afoul of Beijing's preferences as it tacitly implied continuation of de facto Taiwanese independence, as affirmed by Tsai's commentary that "neither side of the Strait belongs to the other" (*haixia liang'an hubu lishu*) (Sullivan, 2024). Beijing launched a three-pronged diplomatic assault on Taiwan, lobbying Taiwan's diplomatic partners, blocking Taiwan from international assemblies (e.g., the WHA and ICAO), and demanding foreign erasure of the terms "Taiwan" or "ROC" (Xin, 2020)

Regarding the rapid changes in Taiwan's national-level diplomatic landscape during the Tsai administration, the trends outlined in the above chart are telling. Taiwan lost ten national-level diplomatic partners during the duration of the Tsai presidency, nearly half of the pre-Tsai total. Most of these were lost soon after the ending of the diplomatic truce by Beijing early in her first term, but several more countries have cut ties with Taipei in favor of Beijing during her second term, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic. This is in sharp contrast to the situation of the Ma Ying-jeou presidency, during which Gambia was the only diplomatic casualty for Taiwan. Even the "scorched earth" diplomatic war seen during the Chen administration yielded a less damaging total net loss of seven diplomatic partners.


Sea Change in US Public Opinion Towards China

A second major change in the diplomatic landscape during the Tsai administration is an unprecedented negative turn in public opinion towards China amongst developed nations, which has been noted to have declined precipitously from the latter half of the 2010s to reach historic lows by the time of COVID-19 pandemic (Silver, Devlin, and Huang, 2020). This period coincided with negative press regarding China's rejection of the Permanent Court of Arbitration's South China Sea Arbitration ruling, pursuit of "wolf warrior diplomacy," violent suppression of the 2019-2020 Hong Kong protests, internal suppression of Uyghur minorities, and role in the start of a global pandemic. The belligerent shift in Beijing's cross-strait policy and military modernization also fed into the general negative feeling towards a "China threat," especially within a global landscape in which overwhelming majorities in developed countries perceive Xi's leadership and China's military strength to be problems (Silver, Huang, and Clancy, 2022). According to survey data from the tail end of the Tsai presidency, having a favorable opinion of Taiwan but not of China has become a widespread opinion, especially amongst high and middle-income countries (Huang and Clancy, 2023).

As shown in the Pew Research data in Figure 2, opinions of China within the US paralleled the historic declines seen across developed countries. Regarding specific timeline trends, those in the US with a favorable view of China went from being a majority to a minority around the time of the ascendancy of Xi Jinping, the unveiling of his "China Dream" of "national rejuvenation," and the Obama administration's so-called "Pivot to Asia." After a slight rebound at the very start of the Trump administration, the Trump/Biden era in the US and the Tsai era in Taiwan coincided with a historically precipitous decline in favorable views towards China and an unprecedented spike in

Most Americans hold an unfavorable view of China

% who have a(n) ___ opinion of China




Note: Those who did not answer are not shown.
 Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q4b.
 "Americans Remain Critical of China"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Republicans give more priority than Democrats to limiting China, but the partisan gap is shrinking

% who say limiting the power and influence of China should be given **top priority** in U.S. long-range foreign policy



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted April 1-7, 2024. Q51f.
 "Americans Remain Critical of China"

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure 2. US Views on China During the Tsai Ing-wen Administration (source: Pew Research Center)

negative views.

An especially important development for subnational diplomacy is the shift in partisan attitudes towards China in the US. Initially, during President Trump’s initiation of a trade war against China, the increase in unfavourability towards China occurred amongst Republicans, with negative views spiking nearly 20 percentage points between 2018 and 2019 within the GOP (Silver, Huang, and Clancy, 2022). However, the initially GOP-led changes became a more bipartisan consensus by the time of Tsai’s second term. As shown in Figure 2, this hostility is not just a general dislike, but also a policy priority, with a clear majority of Republicans and large portions of independents and Democrats listing the need to limit China as the top priority in US foreign policy (Huang, Silver, and Clancy, 2024). Republicans are more likely to call China an “enemy” of the US in contrast to Democrats, who call China a “competitor” of the US, but the overall partisan consensus that China is at minimum not a partner of the US and should be confronted remains constant.

This sea change in opinions towards China in the US is significant as it shifts the Overton window in terms of the political discourse regarding China and cross-strait policy; in a democratic country like the US, the domestic political climate rewards politicians who advocate for confrontation and punishes those who advocate for the extreme minority preference of partnership with China. In light of the view that posits subnational diplomacy as a lucid political medium and a direct projection of domestic politics in the international sphere (Lecours 2002, 109), this Overton window shift is especially pertinent in determining the direction and content of subnational foreign policy.

QUANTITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS: INCREASING VOLUME OF SUBNATIONAL INTERACTIONS AND RELATED FACTORS

Regarding the quantitative aspect, a look at the frequency of subnational engagement between US states and Taiwan during the entirety of the Tsai Ing-wen administration is important in outlining general trends and providing context for a qualitative analysis of the actual political content of such subnational diplomacy during this period. It is not possible to operationalize the frequency or quantitative increases in paradiplomatic activity in an exhaustive manner within this section. Thus, the below analysis includes two proxy measures of subnational engagement between US states and Taiwan: visitations of the Taiwanese president by incumbent US state governors and the opening of state offices in Taiwan.


Both measures are indicative of US state governments' executive level engagement with Taiwan, with state visits by gubernatorial actors actualizing the performative aspects of diplomacy that mirror national-level state visits between national heads of state. Such visits are made further political by the comments made by the chief executives (i.e., governors) representing their state governments in accompanying press conferences with the Taiwanese president. The performance of state visits is also politicized by the reactions to them by national stakeholders in the cross-strait issue.

In contrast, the establishment of state offices represents the institutional element of the subnational relationship, with state offices tasked with the material aspect of US states' relationship with Taiwan: economic partnership and the use of Taiwan as a trading partner. However, per the conflation of "high politics" (defined as issues pertinent to state survival such as national and international security) and "low politics" (defined as non-security issues such as economic and social policies) (Brown, McLean, McMillan, 2018), especially in the Taiwan case, the opening of such offices could also constitute a political statement and not just an economic decision born out of utilitarian calculations of costs and benefits.

Finally, economic developments are also discussed especially in relation to the opening of state offices in Taiwan. Namely, changes in the monetary value of Taiwan as an export and import partner for each US state and the value of the Taiwan market when compared with that of mainland China are examined. These factors are illuminative as the ostensible *raison d'être* of subnational diplomacy is often couched in terms of pure economic partnership by the parties involved.

Visitations of the Taiwanese President by Incumbent US State Governors

Regarding the first proxy measure of gubernatorial "state visits" of Taiwan, the frequency of such visits by year and the partisan makeup of the visiting governors are presented in Figure 3 below. During the Ma Ying-jeou administration (2008-2016) and the diplomatic truce with Beijing, eighteen governors visited the president in Taipei. Ten of these were Republicans and eight were Democrats, presenting a fairly even bipartisan makeup. The US subnational actors conducting Ma-era paradiplomatic state visits were: Idaho, Hawaii, Guam, Oklahoma, Kansas, Vermont, Texas, Delaware, Northern Mariana



Note: Only incumbent governors during the time of visit are shown. Red (striped in print version) for Republican governors and blue (solid in print version) for Democratic governors. Includes US territories. Only official state visits with meetings with the Taiwanese president are shown.

Source: Press conferences archived in the Office of the President ROC Taiwan website.

Figure 3. State Visits of Taiwanese Presidents by Incumbent US Governors

Islands, American Samoa, Wyoming, Arizona, Kentucky, and Montana. There are some recurring state visits by the governor of Guam, and informal visits (not reflected in Figure 3) from former governors such as Jeb Bush of Florida and Jon Huntsman of Utah (the latter having learned Mandarin Chinese as a Mormon missionary in Taiwan and having defended President Trump’s phone call with President Tsai, which angered Beijing) (Summers, 2012).

With the election of Tsai Ing-wen and the waging of a national-level diplomatic war between Beijing and Taipei, the partisan makeup of US gubernatorial state visits changed significantly. After no visitations in 2016, from 2017 to 2022, only Republican governors made the increasingly politicized trip to visit President Tsai Ing-wen. Twelve in total conducted state visits with Tsai during this time, representing the states of Wyoming, Guam, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, Mississippi, Indiana, Arizona, and Virginia. Such trends comported with the GOP’s historically anti-Communist and pro-Taiwan “China Lobby” roots and the aforementioned Pew Research data which showed the GOP to be the main exponent of anti-China sentiment prior to the pandemic.

However, per the increasing partisan convergence on opposition to China seen above, Democratic governors became increasingly bold in conducting state visits with Tsai after the pandemic. This is despite the fact that China’s diplomatic war with Taiwan had not abated but intensified, with Beijing directly expressing its opposition to such state visits (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2022) and engaging in military responses to Tsai’s increasingly high-profile US transits in ways that were not seen during the Ma and Chen years (although parallels with the PRC’s response to Lee Teng-hui’s Cornell visit might be drawn) (Hsiao, 2023). The roster of recent visiting parties includes the Democratic governors of the states of Michigan and New Jersey, who

represented the first incumbent governors of their states to make such visits to Taiwan in history (Office of the President ROC, 2023b, 2024b).


Overall, the frequency of state visits outside the hiatus of 2016 and the pandemic years, the restored bipartisan balance of these visits, and the addition of new states willing to buck Beijing’s increasingly open opposition to subnational diplomacy with Taiwan and to conduct high-profile state visits of Tsai all demonstrate a clear quantifiable increase in subnational interactions between US states and Taiwan.

Establishment of US State Offices in Taiwan

This quantitative increase is also seen in the second proxy measure: establishment of state offices in Taiwan. State offices, the openings of which are sometimes heralded during state visits by US governors (as was the case during such recent visitations as those of Glenn Youngkin of Virginia, Phil Murphy of New Jersey, and Gretchen Whitmer of Michigan), represent the institutional element facilitating the most pedestrian or *prima facie* level of subnational interactions (i.e., economic partnership and utilization of the Taiwan market by US states). For example, the state offices are often established under the auspices of US state-level departments of commerce, departments of agriculture (for states that export farm products to Taiwan), or “economic development authorities” and “organizations” that are tasked by the corresponding state government with attracting business activities and partnership with foreign entities.

On the Taiwanese side, the American State Offices Association (ASOA), closely linked to the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan and Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serves as an organizational liaison for these state offices (Shapiro, 2023). Interestingly, the main organizational goal of ASOA, as stated on its website, is to “facilitate and strengthen bilateral ties between the US and Taiwan” (*jiaqiang Taimei shuangbian guanxi*) instead of between Taiwan and individual US states (ASOA, n.d.).

As seen in this last point, the establishment of state offices certainly cannot be free from considerations of international politics and diplomacy. Chinese diplomatic and economic clout has been cited as the possible reason (along with burdensome maintenance costs) for a string of state office closures after the year 2000 (Tubilewicz and Omond 2021, 210-212). As shown in Figure 4 above, only five of the current twenty-four state offices listed as ASOA members (now representing twenty-three states



Source: Data compiled from the American State Offices Association website.


Figure 4. Dates of Membership (Establishment) for All Current American State Offices Association (ASOA) State Offices in Taiwan

and the Territory of Guam) were established before the Tsai Ing-wen presidency. The net decline continued through Tsai's first term, with a nadir of just six state offices operating in Taiwan by 2020 (Shapiro, 2023).

However, this trend reversed sharply during Tsai's second term, with fully eighteen of twenty-four current state offices having been opened/reopened from 2020 onwards. A more supportive American posture towards Taiwan, supply chain concerns, and federal policies towards China (e.g., Trump's China tariffs and Biden's anti-China CHIPS Act and pro-Taiwan "U.S.-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade") helped to facilitate this change (Shapiro, 2023; Shivakumar, Wessner, and Howell, 2023). This sudden increase further comports with the aforementioned trends in converging partisan views towards China and increased gubernatorial state visits of the president of Taiwan which also occurred during President Tsai's second term.


Taiwan as an Export and Import Partner of US States

The influence of political and economic factors in the establishment of state offices can be analyzed in further detail by looking at the actual monetary value of Taiwan as an export and import partner for the US and its constituent states. Figure 5 below charts time-series data of the total monetary value of US exports to both Taiwan and China from 2016 (the first year of the Tsai presidency in Taiwan) to 2024 (the last year of her administration) using available data from the US Census Bureau. Figure 6 likewise provides equivalent time-series data of imports from Taiwan and China. Despite steady growth in US-Taiwan trade and a visible dent in the total value of US-China trade coinciding with the aftermath of the US-China trade war waged during the first Trump



Source: Made using data from the US Census Bureau. "China" includes Hong Kong and Macao.

Figure 5. Total Monetary Value of US-Taiwan Exports Versus US-China Exports



Source: Made using data from the US Census Bureau. “China” includes Hong Kong and Macao.

Figure 6. Total Monetary Value of US-Taiwan Imports Versus US-China Imports

presidency, national-level data clearly shows that the monetary value of US-China trade far exceeds that of trade between the US and Taiwan in both exports and imports.

The state-level trade statistics paint a more complicated picture, even while broadly reflecting the dominance of the US-China trade relationship shown in the nationwide data. Table A, featured in the appendix, presents the total value in US dollars of each of the fifty states’ exports to Taiwan in 2016 and 2024. The percentage of increase or decrease from 2016 to 2024 is then presented. Finally, the value of state exports to Taiwan in 2024 is presented as a percentage of state exports to China in the same year. Table B, also in the appendix, presents the same information as Table A, except this time using the available import statistics for each US state. Per Table A, Idaho and Vermont were the only two states to have exported a higher value of goods to Taiwan than to China in 2024. Of these two states, the import statistics in Table B also shows Idaho as having a uniquely large difference in favor of Taiwan in the comparative scale of its imports from Taiwan versus China. As a subnational actor, Idaho has engaged in high-profile diplomacy with Taiwan over the years, with its incumbent governors having conducted three state visits of Tsai Ing-wen during her presidency, more than any other US state. Idaho’s Senator Mike Crapo noted that Taiwan constituted the state’s second largest trading partner (behind Canada) and was thus both an important strategic and economic partner (Crapo, 2023). For such states as Idaho, political and economic preferences have converged conveniently. For its part, Taiwan has been favorable towards agricultural imports from US states, with voters supporting the pro-US, pro-DPP position to continue US pork imports in the 2021 anti-ractopamine referendum (Hou, 2021).

For other states, the political/economic dynamic is far from this straightforward.

For example, California, one of Taiwan's largest state-level trading partners in terms of both imports and exports, has no official state office in Taiwan. Instead, the state, having closed its Taiwan state office in 2003, had opened the "California-China Office of Trade and Investment" in Shanghai in 2013 (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., 2013). Despite this lack of institutional presence in Taiwan as well as its emphasis on the China market, California's trade with Taiwan has posted steady growth between 2016 and 2024, and the worth of its Taiwan exports as a percentage of its exports to China is on the high side when compared with other US states. Conversely, amongst states with state offices in Taiwan, although relatively successful cases such as Wyoming exist, such states as Hawaii and Washington that have established state offices in Taiwan prior to 2024 have actually seen substantial decreases in their trade with Taiwan (both exports and imports) during the tail end of Tsai's presidency when compared with the start. Thus, the mutual correlation between the utility of the Taiwan market for US states and the opening of related infrastructure (i.e., state offices) in Taiwan is not always evident.

Another prominent development that is evident from the state-level data is the impact of reshoring and "friendshoring" initiatives that have been a staple of recent US federal-level trade policy. In particular, it was noted that a so-called "China +1" strategy to wean supply chains away from overreliance on China had been catalyzed by trade friction between the US and China during the first Trump administration and has since resulted in declines in electronics imports from China and concurrent increases in equivalent imports from Taiwan (Suzuki, 2021). This trend is evident in Table B, which outlines remarkable growth in electronics imports from Taiwan in such states as Arizona, New Mexico, Kentucky, and Oregon (the Taiwan imports of the latter two having surpassed the total worth of their China imports in 2024). While Kentucky and Oregon do not currently operate state offices in Taiwan, proposals for such offices have been discussed at the state legislative level and an Oregon House of Representatives' bill (HB2756) to establish an Oregon state office in Taiwan is pending review. Per data from the US Census Bureau, the HS (Harmonized System) categories of import items from Taiwan to these states which have seen the most rapid growth in recent years pertain directly to sensitive ICT (information and communication technology) industries (e.g., HS chapters 84 and 85, HS codes 8541 and 8542 for semiconductors and microchips), the same industries in the crosshairs of US supply chain restructuring efforts (as well as Taiwan's "non-red supply chain" initiatives). Geopolitical subtexts are thus manifest in recent trade growth between Taiwan and US states, especially in the realm of imports of ICT items from Taiwan.

In general, in light of the overwhelming utility of the China market over the Taiwan market for nearly all of the fifty US states, the decision to prioritize a smaller market, Taiwan, over the larger market of China via the establishment of state offices in the former makes little sense from a purely economic perspective. Thus, it is clear that the recent spate of US state office openings in Taiwan has been catalyzed not just by a purely economic calculus but also by considerations of political preferences. Such preferences are evident in the geopolitical shifts described in the previous section and in the political rhetoric and actions of US subnational actors that are outlined in the following section below. As shown above, some states opened formal infrastructure in Taiwan notwithstanding trends in trade growth (or even decline) vis-à-vis Taiwan, and even

those states which opened state offices amidst substantive increases in trade with Taiwan have seen markedly increased trade in items targeted by US supply chain de-risking initiatives. Preferences in high politics are thus inextricably linked to trends occurring in the realm of low politics.

QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS: INCREASING POLITICIZATION IN SUBNATIONAL DIPLOMACY BETWEEN US STATES AND TAIWAN

Having thus examined the increased frequency of subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan during the Tsai Ing-wen presidency as well as the importance of political considerations in driving this trend, this section examines notable examples of the increased politicization of US-Taiwan paradiplomacy.

First, increasingly political rhetoric is evident in the discourse of the main interlocutors. This is seen within the comments made by US state governors and Taiwanese presidents during state visits by the former. One recurring theme of remarks made during such occasions during the Tsai presidency (especially during the bipartisan wave of post-pandemic visits) is constant references to the compatibility of Taiwan and the US's political systems and their shared system of democracy. For example, a recent visitor, Governor Gretchen Whitmer of Michigan, commented on the January 2024 election, stating that it represented "a testament to the strength of Taiwan's democracy" (Office of the President ROC Taiwan, 2024b). Governor Greg Gianforte, who chose Taiwan as the destination for his first international trade mission as governor in 2023, referred to Taiwan as a "country" (c.f., the US State Department's careful avoidance of the term "country" in referring to Taiwan) and noted Taiwan and Montana's "shared values of freedom and free enterprise" (Office of the President ROC Taiwan, 2023a).

In contrast, such references to political democracy or shared systems and values were largely absent in the press releases of US gubernatorial state visits made during the Ma Ying-jeou administration. Such gubernatorial visits of Ma Ying-jeou did broach national topics, but the commentary was limited to President Ma or governors acknowledging US state efforts to effectuate Taiwan's participation in international organizations (e.g., the ICAO, WHO, etc.) or trade dialogues between the US and Taiwan (e.g., TIFA negotiations), topics that constitute rhetorical mainstays of such bilateral summits, including those of the Tsai Ing-wen administration. Ma Ying-jeou did also mention arms deals and security cooperation later in his administration but these were made within the context of President Obama's arms deal moratorium and its eventual lifting.

An interesting feature of Ma Ying-jeou's summits with US governors is that President Ma often used these occasions to explain his policies regarding cross-strait relations and the consensus he had facilitated with Beijing regarding Taiwan's national identity. For example, in one such instance (during a 2013 state visit by Governor Matt Mead of Wyoming), Ma explained that the ROC defers to the ROC Constitution which posits Taiwan as the Republic of China (which covers the territory of mainland China) and that a cross-strait consensus had been reached via the 92 Consensus (i.e., the KMT

interpretation of “one China with respective interpretations” or “*yige Zhongguo gezi biaoshu*”) (Office of the President ROC Taiwan, 2013b).

President Ma also emphasized the efficacy of his “low key, no surprises” (*didiao lingyiwai*) approach to ties with the United States, which had the effect of bringing “restored mutual trust” and “substantive achievements” to the relationship (Office of the President Taiwan ROC, 2013a). Presented in contrast to the DPP Chen administration’s unilateral decisions on national identity and national referenda that occurred without US notification or endorsement, the idea of “no surprises” has been used as a measure of perceived pragmatism and ability in navigating potentially politically sensitive interactions with the United States. The DPP has also adopted this rhetoric, with the new DPP vice president, Hsiao Bi-khim, recently vouching for outgoing president Tsai Ing-wen’s “no surprises” bona fides and Lai Ching-te’s ability to replicate that success (Chen, 2024). Overall, Ma’s interactions with US governors emphasized the maintenance of Taiwan’s political consensus with Beijing and, for the most part, a low-key focus on cooperation on low political issues without the explicit emphasis on an alignment with the US based on common political or value systems seen during the Tsai presidency.

Another interesting addition to subnational rhetoric during the Tsai administration that demonstrates the link between national-level politics and subnational diplomacy is the inclusion of rhetoric regarding a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). This foreign policy doctrine, which originated from the ideation of the late Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, had originally been adopted by the US and its other allies during the Trump administration and continued to be utilized through the Biden administration, presently constituting a “ubiquitous *idée fixe*” within the foreign policy and security rhetoric of the US and aligned countries (Hosoya, 2019; Kim and Park 2023, 72).

For instance, during her hosting of Indiana Governor Eric Holcomb, the first US governor to visit Tsai after the hiatus of the COVID-19 pandemic, President Tsai indirectly referenced the US foreign policy initiative of FOIP, stating that “Taiwan and United States are partners who both love democracy and freedom, and are key security and economic allies in the Indo-Pacific region” (Office of the President ROC Taiwan, 2022). Governor Phil Murphy of New Jersey, representing the first sitting governor of his state to visit Taiwan, announced that New Jersey’s first Asia-Pacific office would be opening in Taipei and that the two sides were “going to work together in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific and importantly, planting a flag in Taipei, not just for Taipei or Taiwan but to use this as our base for all of Asia” (Office of the President ROC Taiwan, 2023b).

Such rhetoric only intensified after the 2022 outbreak of war in Ukraine. In April 2024, the National Governors Association (NGA), a public policy liaison with the federal government made up of the governors of all US states, territories, commonwealths (and a rare repository of bipartisan policy consensus in otherwise deeply divided US politics), released a statement in favor of congressional passage of a \$95 billion war aid package to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan. In explaining this decision by the NGA, the NGA Vice-Chair at that time Governor Jared Polis of Colorado (who met Tsai during the sixth of Tsai’s seven highly-politicized “transit” trips to the US and who now serves as the chair of the NGA) noted that there was “growing uncertainty in the Indo-Pacific” and that “passing legislation to support our allies in Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan will demonstrate

Congress's commitment to our nation's security and the security of our allies" (National Governors Association, 2024). Thus, Taiwan is explicitly stated by subnational actors to be an essential constituent of a FOIP as well as an "ally" of the United States.

This alliance rhetoric has become a common theme in US-Taiwan subnational diplomacy. In 2024, resolutions by US state legislatures declared that "peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is crucial to the maintenance of a free and open Indo-Pacific" (mirroring US federal-level rhetoric essentially demanding the maintenance of the status quo in cross-strait relations) and that "Taiwan is an indispensable partner in safeguarding peace and stability in the region" (Liu, 2024). The adoption of national-level foreign policy rhetoric regarding FOIP and the Taiwan Strait is indicative of the Tsai-era politicization of subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan, in which national-level political confrontations in a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape have also become manifest at the subnational level.

As is the case in national-level diplomacy, low political issues pertaining especially to the economy carry implications for issues of high politics. As is seen in the national-level conversations surrounding decoupling, the procurement of secure supply chains with democratic partners, and the fear of Chinese fabrication of advanced semiconductors via TSMC in Taiwan as well as talent poaching and intellectual property (IP) theft targeting Taiwan's semiconductor sector (which fueled US export control measures and the Biden administration's March 2022 proposal of a "Chip 4" alliance of the US, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to further entrench these powers' control over the global semiconductor industry), economic policy cannot be divorced from geopolitics (Sutter, Sargent, and Singh, 2023). At the subnational level, as seen in the previous section, geopolitical alignment drove a wave of state governments to establish state offices in Taiwan, these states clearly prioritizing a smaller yet politically expedient market in Taiwan over a much larger yet politically stigmatized one in China, especially in terms of imports of key ICT items.

Subnational actors have directly referenced the link between the economic and the political in their interactions with Taiwan. For example, within her remarks to President Tsai in 2024, Governor Whitmer announced the signing of an MOU on economic and trade cooperation to boost bilateral ties in fields such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, and artificial intelligence and stated that by doing so "we can establish secure supply chains and create comprehensive industry clusters" (Office of the President ROC Taiwan, 2024b). At times, the governor spoke not just as a representative of an individual state but almost as a proxy for the United States as a whole, congratulating Tsai on strengthening relations between Taiwan and the US as well as stating that her administration was doing its best to "contribute to the strength of the US-Taiwan relationship." Similar rhetoric citing the security of supply chains and even the creation of "non-red supply chains" have also featured in more recent interactions between US states governments and Taiwan (Office of the President ROC Taiwan, 2025a, 2025b).

For its part, Taiwan has also played an active role in facilitating this geopolitical policy discourse. In the last month of her presidency, Tsai Ing-wen hosted a delegation from the Center for Asia-Pacific Resilience and Innovation (CAPRI) led by former Virginia Governor James S. Gilmore (Office of the President ROC Taiwan, 2024a). CAPRI was introduced as the Taiwan's first international think tank focused on public

policy research, and its mandate was outlined as increasing Taiwan's discourse power on the international stage at a time in which "authoritarian expansion is on the rise" (Office of the President ROC Taiwan, 2024a). Although ostensibly focused on issues outside security and geopolitics, the think tank does not shy away from issues relevant to such topics. For example, amongst the activities listed in its 2023 Annual Report, CAPRI listed a policy report titled "Reshaping Economic Interdependence in the Indo-Pacific" which investigated the implications of US-China decoupling on Taiwan's economy and the findings of which were presented to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the US State Department (CAPRI, 2024).

In addition to former Governor Gilmore's association with CAPRI, the organization boasts an impressive roster of international personalities in its "International Advisory Council" including former Australian PM Malcolm Turnbull (known for his advocacy for the National Security Legislation Amendment Act of 2018 which aimed to combat alleged Chinese intervention in Australian politics). CAPRI is also closely associated with the Miller Center of the University of Virginia, with Virginia as a state having recently become a hotspot of subnational activity with regards to the Taiwan issue. The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a nonprofit organization of conservative state legislators and private sector members which proposes model legislation for US state governments, is also based in Virginia. In 2022, ALEC drafted a model resolution for state legislatures with Taiwan Friendship Caucuses, which emphasized that Taiwan and the US shared the same values system and that pro-Taiwan legislative caucuses will commit to supporting subnational partnership with Taiwan and Taiwan's participation in international organizations (ALEC, 2022).

The Commonwealth of Virginia has become further embroiled in cross-strait politics with the entry of the Republican anti-China, pro-Taiwan firebrand Glenn Youngkin to the governor's mansion in 2022. Glenn Youngkin's bona fides as a China hawk were demonstrated in a decision he made in early 2023 to reject a planned construction of an electric battery plant in Danville, Virginia by Ford Motors Co. over concerns related to Ford's inclusion of the Chinese company Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL) as a partner in the project (Schneider, 2023). The plant's cancellation caused considerable political fallout in Richmond, with support for and opposition to both the governor's decision and a Republican bill proposal to prohibit state agencies from entering into contracts with a company owned or operated by a "foreign adversary" (including China) coinciding largely with partisan affiliation (Schneider and Vozzella, 2023).

It has been noted that President Trump used arms sales to Taiwan to procure manufacturing jobs, especially for regions that had voted for his "America First" economic populism (Tubilewicz and Omond 2021, 227-228). Thus, for President Trump and the GOP, who had facilitated unprecedented arms sales to Taiwan after President Obama's alternation between arms sales and arms sale moratoriums, a pro-Taiwan and anti-China *modus operandi* in business dealings yielded the dual semiotic benefit of proving to voters their willingness to protect American jobs while also combating China. What distinguishes the Ford-CATL affair from this context of Republican politics is that the former case entailed a GOP governor turning down 2,500 blue-collar jobs for his state for the cause of limiting China's state-level presence. The eventual relocation of the

project to Michigan was also subjected to partisan debate, with Republicans in the state legislature opposing the project (Michigan House Republicans, 2024). Similarly, another battery plant project involving a Chinese company in Green Township, Michigan has stirred considerable local controversy and spirited opposition (Perkins and Hawkins, 2024).

As seen in these case studies, various actors have engaged in efforts to limit the US's subnational interactions with China even while concurrently encouraging a wave of subnational attention towards Taiwan. In addition to state-level actors, national (federal)-level actors have often been the proponents of such efforts. Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut, in a 2020 interview on the topic of the proposed City and State Diplomacy Act (which he as a Democrat and Republican Senator David Perdue of Georgia introduced in the US Senate), openly stated that the bill was designed to counter China's subnational diplomacy with the US. Regarding this aim and the bill's provision to create an office within the US State Department to coordinate subnational foreign policy, Senator Murphy stated that "like our broader efforts to counter China, we cannot be satisfied with being reactive; we need a proactive agenda" (Putz, 2020). Senator Murphy's comments regarding the possible instrumentalization of US subnational institutions and coopting of future national political leaders by China mirror the analysis of Secretary Pompeo, whom Murphy cites, as well as the analysis of an extensive report by Stanford University's Hoover Institute, which details the alleged infiltration of Chinese influence into American institutions, including those at the state and local levels (Diamond and Schell, 2019).

The proposed office of subnational diplomacy came to fruition with the 2022 establishment of the Subnational Diplomacy Unit (SDU) of the US Department of State. Section 9108 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2023 tasked the Special Representative for City and State Diplomacy with drafting a strategic plan for the Unit to counter "subnational diplomacy efforts from adversarial nations."³ The Unit has also been noted to have provided targeted China briefings to state governors per requests by gubernatorial offices (Hart, 2025). Within the released Functional Bureau Strategy of the SDU, the US State Department dedicated an entire page to subnational de-risking strategies vis-à-vis the PRC while also emphasizing international democratic alignment involving US local and state-level actors elsewhere in the document (U.S. Department of State, 2024). The US federal government's preferences (and dispreferences) regarding US states' diplomatic partners have thus been made clear in pertinent policy documents.

In addition to these national (federal)-level actions, a spate of state-level legislation has recently been passed in conservative states that restricts the ability of PRC nationals to buy and own property in those states. A high-profile supporter of this legislation has been Governor Ron DeSantis of Florida, one of the biggest state-level GOP winners of the 2022 midterm elections; however, a Democrat state representative co-sponsored the said bill in Florida, demonstrating some degree of bipartisan support for such legislation (Hatzipanagos, 2023). Such bills follow the examples set by the Trump/Biden

³ Pub. L. No. 117-263 (2023), <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-17475/pdf/COMPS-17475.pdf>.

administrations' shared suspicions regarding business deals involving China and by the avoidance of such dealings by governors at the state level (e.g., the Ford-CATL incident).

Despite increasing alignment, partisan differences regarding China policy do still exist; as shown above, most Republicans see China as an adversary of the US while Democrats mostly see the country as a competitor state. Furthermore, there are still US subnational actors who are sympathetic to the view of US-China partnership, a view that has become a small minority even within the Democratic Party. The most notable examples of these politicians come from the State of California, the largest state in the union and one with a long and complicated history with China. Former Governor Jerry Brown, having facilitated the opening of a state office in Shanghai during his tenure, has headed the California-China Climate Institute at UC Berkeley in his retirement and remained a critic of the bipartisan escalation of tensions against China and of decoupling (Begert, 2023; Martin, 2023).

His successor, incumbent Governor Gavin Newsom has been evaluated by a Chinese think tank in 2019 to have an "ambiguous" policy stance towards China (D&C Think-tank, 2019). Since then, Newsom bucked the trend of US governors visiting the Taiwanese side of the strait and made a state visit to China in 2023, becoming the first US governor in six years to meet with Xi Jinping and going on the record in stating that "de-risking" (a moderated and euphemized version of "decoupling") should entail "nothing more than diversification" (Toh, 2023). Of course, even within the California Democratic Party, the trend against subnational interactions with China is strong, and it was a Taiwanese-born California congressman, Ted Lieu, who introduced in 2021 a bill designed to limit China's subnational diplomacy with the US (Library of Congress, 2021). Ultimately, per the shifting of the Overton window regarding policy towards both sides of the strait, the diminished political feasibility of cooperation in subnational interactions with China or conversely of avoidance in such interactions with Taiwan will most likely continue to set the tone of US subnational interactions with both going forward.

A TYPOLOGY OF TSAI-ERA SUBNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

Having thus surveyed the specific cases of politicization in subnational diplomacy during the Tsai administration, one may ask the question of where such instances of paradiplomatic "high politics" fit within the typology of political uses of subnational diplomacy evident in existing literature and discussed earlier in this paper. In particular, within the present typology of paradiplomacy, the concepts of "protodiplomacy" and "counter-paradiplomacy" (CPD) constitute frameworks which address the political uses of paradiplomacy and which have direct relevance to the case of Taiwan and US states.

Subnational Diplomacy Between Taiwan and US States as a Case of "Protodiplomacy"

The concept of "protodiplomacy" was proposed to denote the utilization of subnational diplomacy to effectuate political secessionism or separatism (Duchacek 1986;

Cornago, 2018). While this basal political motive constitutes a common denominator of the various definitions of protodiplomacy coinhabiting existing scholarship, some definitional controversy may arise regarding which political entities constitute the main actors engaging in protodiplomacy. For example, Duchacek's early formulation defines protodiplomacy as the secessionist paradiplomatic activities of a "non-central government." Thus, much of the subsequent literature regarding the concept focused on such subnational governments within federated systems as the provincial government of Quebec (McHugh, 2015; Labrecque and Harrison, 2018).

However, in the real world, protodiplomatic actors often do not conform to a single archetype, and degrees of autonomy vary considerably even amongst federated constituents. This diversity is evident in existing scholarship, with protodiplomacy having been mentioned in connection with such cases as post-devolution Scotland (Czapiewski, 2015), the Republic of Tatarstan within the Russian Federation (Slocum, 1999), and ethnically Kurdish entities, especially the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq (Mohammed and Owtram, 2014; Ababakr, 2020). In addition, in light of the variegated paradiplomatic landscape, it has been argued that the concept of "protodiplomacy" may also apply to the cases of "de facto states" or "quasi-states" (Cornago 2018, 5-6; Ganohariti and Dijkhoorn 2020, 333), which contrasts with Duchacek's seminal definition which narrowed protodiplomacy, *totem pro parte*, to the actions of non-central governments.

Per this terminological calculus, Taiwan can be strongly argued to be a practitioner of protodiplomacy via its paradiplomatic interactions with US states. In one study of island jurisdictions as "antechambers" of paradiplomacy, it was noted that Taiwan represents a *sui generis* political entity, at once "a normal state, a government-in-exile, and a de facto state engaging in both official and internationally recognized channels of diplomacy in some cases and cloaked paradiplomatic exchanges in others" (Bartmann 2006, 60). Of these various guises, the status of Taiwan as a de-facto, albeit widely unrecognized, country places Taiwan squarely within the purview of an actor of protodiplomacy per the broadening interpretation of the term seen above. This definitional expansion is also pertinent to the tacit aims of Taiwan's protodiplomacy, as the existing literature has effectively widened the possible motives of protodiplomacy to the general aims of so-called "high politics" (Czapiewski 2015, 63) (c.f., Duchacek's original emphasis on secession).

As seen in the previous section, Taiwan's interactions with US state governments during the Tsai presidency often directly invoked issues of "high politics" (e.g., emphasis of shared political systems and values-based diplomacy, alliance rhetoric and invocations of FOIP, rhetoric regarding de-risking and secure supply chains, *inter alia*) while retaining a subtext of encouraging Taiwan's political separation or independence from China. Despite this recent crescendo in politicized paradiplomacy, such uses of paradiplomacy of course predated Tsai, as seen above in Ma Ying-jeou's invocations of the cross-strait issue and the prominent issue of US arms deals with Taiwan during his meetings with US governors. It has also been noted on the basis of interviews with former US governors and state officials conducted during the Chen Shui-bian administration that the Taiwan lobby rivaled the Israel lobby in its proactive persuasion of state-level officials (McMillan 2012, 18-19, 56). Taiwan's continuing political presence

is also evident in the invitation of representatives from local branches of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in the US to attend state legislature sessions passing pro-Taiwan resolutions (Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Atlanta, 2023). In sum, it is clear that those instances of Taiwan's paradiplomatic interactions with US states that intersect with issues of "high politics" could constitute protodiplomacy per the term's current conceptual bounds and are thus marked as such within the typology of paradiplomacy summarized in Table 1 below.

China's Reaction to Subnational Diplomacy Between US States and Taiwan as a Case of "Counter-Paradiplomacy"

Unsurprisingly, the broaching of "high-politics" and enactment of protodiplomacy evident in recent interactions between Taiwan and US states have engendered fierce political reactions in national-level diplomacy. In particular, China has increasingly scrutinized this subnational diplomacy, attempting to limit such diplomacy and to apply the national-level standard of the "one-China principle" to the US's subnational-level actors. Having already described Taiwan's political use of paradiplomacy with US states as protodiplomacy in the previous subsection, a question remains regarding whether the current typology of paradiplomacy could adequately describe the current reactions of national actors to such politically controversial instances of subnational diplomacy. Namely, the aforementioned phenomenon of a national-level actor (i.e., China) attempting to suppress paradiplomatic relations between Taiwan and US states for political reasons requires categorical description. Regarding this, as noted earlier, the concept of counter-paradiplomacy or CPD was proposed with a typology of cases to describe a "state-driven reactive policy aimed at disrupting and sabotaging paradiplomacy" (Castan Pinos and Sacramento, 2024).

An earlier explication of the concept by the same authors defined the practice of CPD as "actions undertaken by a governmental actor, typically a state, against an entity's paradiplomacy [...] to curtail paradiplomatic engagement or stifle its objectives" (Castan Pinos and Sacramento 2019, 100). Castan Pinos and Sacramento propose three types of CPD. Type 1 involves CPD by a state against the paradiplomacy of one of its constituent regions with the aim of countering a secessionist movement. Type 2 involves CPD by a "parent state" or "ex-parent state" against the diplomacy of a "de facto state" which has "unilaterally declared independence" and which has ability to "exert control over the territory" it claims; in such cases of Type 2 CPD, the former attempts to counter the latter's pursuit of survival and international recognition. The China-Taiwan case is listed by the authors as an example of this second type, but no further details or analysis of Type 2 CPD vis-à-vis Taiwan are provided (Castan Pinos and Sacramento 2024, 201). Finally, Type 3 CPD deals with the efforts by a third state to counter the paradiplomacy of a non-state entity without recognized sovereign statehood, such as a "constituent region, de facto state, or dependent overseas territory" (Castan Pinos and Sacramento 2024, 204). A major difference between Type 2 and Type 3, which can both involve de facto countries like Taiwan, is the secessionist dynamic that exists between the party targeted by CPD and the party committing CPD.

In the case of Tsai-era subnational diplomacy, the second classification of CPD

fits well as a theoretical descriptor of China's actions vis-à-vis subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan. China has proven to be very much aware and wary of recent trends in such subnational diplomacy. During his meeting with California Governor Gavin Newsom during the latter's China visit, Xi Jinping commented that the vitality of China-US relations "lies in sub-national areas" (The State Council PRC, 2023). China would also be aware of recent trends in Europe, where expanding subnational interactions between Taiwan and Central European countries have led the Czech Republic to become estranged from the PRC and to pursue alignment with Taiwan (Jerzewski, 2023; McVicar, 2023). China has acted on this wariness by compiling information on the foreign policy orientations of US governors and their attitudes towards China (e.g., the "D&C Think-tank," based in Beijing, produced several relevant reports on the subject during the period of the Tsai administration). Additionally, the Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS), called at the time of its establishment the only Chinese think tank in Washington D.C., has also paid attention to subnational actors, publishing a report in 2023 that described potential future presidential candidate Glenn Youngkin's Taiwan visit as a trip to "showcase US efforts to combat Chinese influence" (ICAS, 2023).

In addition to this information gathering regarding US subnational actors, China engaged in more direct actions to disrupt and to discourage subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan. In 2022, in direct response to Indiana Governor Eric J. Holcomb's visit of Tsai Ing-wen in Taiwan, the PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesperson stated that China "opposes official US exchanges with the Taiwan region in any form and under any name" and urges the "relevant party in the US to abide by the one-China principle and the three China-US joint communiqués and stop all forms of official interactions with the Taiwan region" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2022). Thus, China had demanded that a US subnational state government adhere to the same diplomatic standard that the PRC had set for the US federal government. The spokesperson also mentioned that China had made serious *démarches* to the US over the Holcomb visit. In 2023, China's Foreign Ministry released another statement lambasting US permission of President Tsai's transit visits (which often result in meetings between Tsai and various state and federal level officials) as a *de facto* violation of the one-China principle (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2023).

In addition to these direct protestations, a host of other cases of interference by China in US subnational diplomacy were listed by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo during his 2020 speech to the National Governors Association. During his speech, Pompeo mentioned an incident regarding Governor Phil Bryant of Mississippi who allegedly received a letter from the PRC consul's office in Houston, which threatened to cancel Chinese investment if the governor went ahead with his planned Taiwan visit (Pompeo, 2020). Though unsuccessful in preventing the state visit, the PRC's economic coercion against Governor Bryant certainly constituted an attempt to disrupt or sabotage the subnational relations of a *de facto* state seeking recognition (i.e., Taiwan). More specifically, the above instances of Chinese interference in the subnational interactions between US states and Taiwan clearly constitute examples of the second type of CPD per Castan Pinos and Sacramento's typology and have thus been categorized as such in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Typology of Subnational Diplomacy During the Tsai Ing-wen Administration

Typology of Paradiplomacy	Applicable Cases
Protodiplomacy	The intersection between Taiwan's paradiplomatic interactions with US states and issues of high politics.
Type 2 CPD: (ex)parent state counters the paradiplomacy of a de facto state (Castan Pinos and Sacramento, 2024)	The PRC's efforts to limit subnational diplomacy between Taiwan and US states.

CONCLUSION

This paper analyzed the phenomenon of subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan, focusing on recent paradiplomatic developments that coincided with the consequential period of Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen administration (2016-2024). After a comprehensive survey of relevant discussions and literature regarding the concept of subnational diplomacy, this paper addressed two questions: whether subnational diplomacy during the Tsai administration demonstrated continuity or discontinuity with past instances of paradiplomacy and what factors in high and low politics drove such developments. Regarding these questions, this paper demonstrated how subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan has indeed undergone quantitative and qualitative change during the Tsai presidency, increasing both in terms of volume and politicization due to the shifting political environments of Taiwan and the United States. Finally, in relation to the latter point of politicization, the theoretical utility of the concepts of "protodiplomacy" and "counter-paradiplomacy" (CPD) in analysis of this topic was also discussed, with the former concept used to describe Taiwan's interactions at the subnational level with US states and the latter describing China's reactive strategies towards such instances of paradiplomacy, respectively.

Ultimately, this paper demonstrated how an invigorated relationship between Taiwan and US state-level actors during the Tsai Ing-wen administration emerged from the interplay between high politics and low politics, blurring the lines that ostensibly separates them. In particular, the above analysis elucidated the strong correlations between the dynamics of the national-level diplomatic triangle during the Tsai-era (e.g., Cold War-esque geopolitical realignment, resumption of China's diplomatic war against Taiwan, bipartisan US consensus towards a hardline anti-China policy stance) and concomitant dynamics at the subnational level. Simultaneously, per the erosion of impediments to states' diplomatic agency within the US's federated system and the increasing visibility of subnational diplomacy on a transnational world stage, the current trajectory points to further increases in the frequency and political significance of subnational diplomacy between US states and Taiwan in the future.

Regarding the current outlook, it is clear that such uses of subnational diplomacy are conducive to Taiwan's salami slicing towards de-facto recognition from geopolitically

aligned powers such as the US. It is also clear that China shares this view of the situation, as evidenced by its efforts at CPD and its attempts to tether the diplomacy of US state governments to the “One China” policy standard. However, the novelty of the subnational diplomatic arena as well as the more variegated nature of state-level policymaking when compared with the national-level mean that both the implications and repercussions of paradiplomacy between US states and Taiwan remain speculative and subject to change. Ultimately, continual analysis of this topic will be crucial going forward as US states and a new DPP administration in the form of the Lai Ching-te presidency negotiate their relationship within the novel diplomatic realm of subnational diplomacy.

APPENDIX

Table A. Taiwan as an Export Market for US States at the Start and End of the Tsai Administration.

State	Total value of 2016 exports to Taiwan in US dollars	Total value of 2024 exports to Taiwan in US dollars	Percentage of increase from 2016 to 2024	2024 exports to Taiwan as a percentage of 2024 exports to China
Alabama	198,898,601	370,739,077	+86.4%	8.8%
Alaska	29,225,622	96,817,682	+231.3%	6.4%
Arizona	396,592,301	1,322,214,200	+233.4%	64.1%
Arkansas	70,160,302	93,550,920	+33.3%	37.3%
California	6,986,667,407	9,563,192,560	+36.9%	46.2%
Colorado	205,389,626	295,866,787	+44.1%	32.3%
Connecticut	137,945,399	293,790,971	+113%	16.9%
Delaware	97,608,052	164,787,643	+68.8%	27.6%
Florida	263,959,513	280,174,542	+6.1%	11.1%
Georgia	413,796,958	882,097,161	+113.2%	21.8%
Hawaii	9,542,166	9,168,033	-3.9% (*)	29.6%
Idaho	637,273,877	473,098,272	-25.8% (*)	253.2% (**)
Illinois	690,966,092	807,053,821	+16.8%	15.5%
Indiana	181,016,818	262,998,773	+45.3%	5%
Iowa	154,851,157	127,218,700	-17.8% (*)	12.3%
Kansas	167,579,424	306,650,946	+83%	31.1%
Kentucky	174,479,003	327,857,518	+87.9%	6.6%
Louisiana	303,990,696	713,334,294	+134.7%	6.9%

State	Total value of 2016 exports to Taiwan in US dollars	Total value of 2024 exports to Taiwan in US dollars	Percentage of increase from 2016 to 2024	2024 exports to Taiwan as a percentage of 2024 exports to China
Maine	61,538,113	27,953,979	-54.6% (*)	16.4%
Maryland	114,853,212	191,049,029	+66.3%	15.5%
Massachusetts	656,717,531	747,259,921	+13.8%	17.3%
Michigan	298,593,633	257,391,282	-13.8% (*)	11.3%
Minnesota	457,385,901	644,069,055	40.8%	28.5%
Mississippi	47,730,725	200,123,332	31.9%	28.9%
Missouri	77,534,367	92,835,155	19.7%	13.1%
Montana	57,568,796	53,390,517	-7.3% (*)	39.6%
Nebraska	105,164,778	255,090,395	+142.6%	33.5%
Nevada	46,294,157	311,628,761	+573.1%	26.1%
New Hampshire	35,660,437	44,586,916	+25%	8.9%
New Jersey	502,554,378	822,805,415	+63.7%	29.9%
New Mexico	5,161,890	255,422,342	+4848.2%	12.9%
New York	637,374,374	1,770,665,449	+177.8%	15.9%
North Carolina	275,629,429	400,491,326	+45.3%	6.4%
North Dakota	7,796,574	27,317,171	+250.4%	69.2%
Ohio	423,836,840	1,182,967,799	+179.1%	36.4%
Oklahoma	23,132,984	45,900,652	+98.4%	14.1%
Oregon	815,608,501	843,890,618	+3.5%	13.6%
Pennsylvania	360,167,326	494,904,804	+37.4%	12.8%
Rhode Island	101,105,005	32,401,498	-68% (*)	22.2%
South Carolina	269,366,732	391,494,624	+45.3%	11.2%
South Dakota	5,063,811	9,675,391	+91.1%	5.7%
Tennessee	264,509,900	415,542,643	+57.1%	9.1%
Texas	4,294,262,949	11,418,812,662	+165.9%	44.7%
Utah	610,106,867	209,377,372	-65.7% (*)	15.4%
Vermont	95,769,517	254,333,198	+165.6%	133% (**)
Virginia	523,629,470	650,585,159	+24.2%	39.8%
Washington	3,102,698,721	2,080,437,300	-32.9% (*)	16.8%
West Virginia	29,592,910	31,379,581	+6%	6.6%
Wisconsin	185,318,511	661,130,685	+256.8%	39%

State	Total value of 2016 exports to Taiwan in US dollars	Total value of 2024 exports to Taiwan in US dollars	Percentage of increase from 2016 to 2024	2024 exports to Taiwan as a percentage of 2024 exports to China
Wyoming	22,176,975	40,591,044	+83%	31.6%

Source: Calculated using data from the US Census Bureau

Note: "China" includes Hong Kong and Macao. (*): decreases in exports to Taiwan. (**): states reporting higher export totals to Taiwan than China in 2024.

Table B. Taiwan as an Import Supplier for US States at the Start and End of the Tsai Administration.

State	Total value of 2016 imports from Taiwan in US dollars	Total value of 2024 imports from Taiwan in US dollars	Percentage of increase from 2016 to 2024	2024 imports from Taiwan as a percentage of 2024 imports from China
Alabama	136,926,384	302,675,025	+121%	7.6%
Alaska	30,938,307	70,252,382	+127.1%	75.3%
Arizona	468,301,176	3,554,263,030	+659%	64.9%
Arkansas	143,537,571	139,276,157	-3% (*)	13.3%
California	12,324,294,270	40,490,816,709	+228.5%	32.8%
Colorado	415,296,654	563,720,555	+35.7%	30.6%
Connecticut	233,212,648	215,127,167	-7.8% (*)	15.7%
Delaware	93,087,215	124,344,076	+33.6%	18.3%
Florida	975,021,245	1,287,972,546	+32.1%	10%
Georgia	1,617,720,886	2,911,228,895	+80%	16.7%
Hawaii	50,874,358	40,559,398	-20.3% (*)	16.3%
Idaho	381,509,306	701,677,613	+83.9%	229.4% (**)
Illinois	2,149,914,381	4,387,023,230	+104.1%	10.4%
Indiana	680,995,464	1,171,055,688	+72%	12.6%
Iowa	165,767,294	186,087,610	+12.3%	14.3%
Kansas	908,542,011	1,142,280,493	+25.7%	75.6%
Kentucky	615,911,376	7,944,602,982	+1189.9%	117% (**)
Louisiana	106,109,359	252,893,279	+138.3%	21.3%
Maine	22,234,232	17,524,824	-21.2% (*)	9.7%
Maryland	242,015,760	410,920,072	+69.8%	15.5%
Massachusetts	630,112,275	582,226,583	-7.6% (*)	16.9%

State	Total value of 2016 imports from Taiwan in US dollars	Total value of 2024 imports from Taiwan in US dollars	Percentage of increase from 2016 to 2024	2024 imports from Taiwan as a percentage of 2024 imports from China
Michigan	866,535,491	1,410,438,574	+62.8%	15.6%
Minnesota	634,620,969	850,717,729	+34.1%	12.6%
Mississippi	251,045,167	490,226,901	+95.3%	16.6%
Missouri	394,142,460	505,566,140	+28.3%	11.9%
Montana	8,399,927	9,668,451	+15.1%	10.1%
Nebraska	59,029,018	117,025,621	+98.3%	15.5%
Nevada	426,920,540	1,608,968,663	+276.9%	32.5%
New Hampshire	85,477,661	226,026,346	+164.4%	42%
New Jersey	1,471,112,221	2,587,121,774	+75.9%	18.1%
New Mexico	46,341,106	1,850,837,117	+3893.9%	96.4%
New York	1,567,041,411	2,205,602,990	+40.7%	9.8%
North Carolina	833,165,078	1,282,737,927	+54%	17.9%
North Dakota	10,418,183	14,126,691	+35.6%	9.4%
Ohio	1,113,215,469	1,778,293,087	+59.7%	17.2%
Oklahoma	154,749,768	213,780,651	+38.1%	8.1%
Oregon	513,347,330	4,504,056,094	+777.4%	167.5% (**)
Pennsylvania	616,794,496	1,174,138,481	+90.4%	7.1%
Rhode Island	40,139,907	59,367,887	+47.9%	10.7%
South Carolina	584,185,233	1,024,283,313	+75.3%	11.2%
South Dakota	21,290,012	17,018,695	-20.1% (*)	6.6%
Tennessee	1,142,097,837	7,341,025,588	+542.8%	35%
Texas	2,329,660,614	14,166,938,351	+508.1%	39.3%
Utah	365,196,405	1,547,401,830	+323.7%	57.9%
Vermont	39,958,644	55,333,339	+38.5%	29.1%
Virginia	309,303,072	872,445,868	+182.1%	15.2%
Washington	1,749,561,283	1,574,751,837	-10% (*)	14%
West Virginia	24,441,630	36,556,452	+49.6%	17.7%
Wisconsin	513,601,224	1,211,408,617	+135.9%	18.8%
Wyoming	5,489,113	4,006,729	-27% (*)	3.2%

Source: Calculated using data from the US Census Bureau

Note: "China" includes Hong Kong and Macao. (*): decreases in imports from Taiwan. (**): states reporting higher import totals from Taiwan than from China in 2024.

REFERENCES

- Ababakr, Yasin Mahmood. 2020. "Iraqi Kurdistan Region: From Paradiplomacy to Protodiplomacy." *Review of Economics and Political Science* 8, no. 4: 309–28. <https://doi.org/10.1108/reps-01-2020-0002>.
- Aldecoa, Francisco, and Michael Keating. 2013. *Paradiplomacy in action: The foreign relations of subnational governments*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.
- Ali, Ahmadi. 2023. "China, Russia Face Sanctions from US States Now. That's Dangerous." Al Jazeera, March 24, 2023, Accessed June 19, 2024. <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2023/3/24/the-next-us-sanctions-could-come-from-states-thats-dangerous>.
- American Legislative Exchange Council. 2024. "Taiwan Friendship Caucus Resolution. April 3, 2024, Accessed June 21, 2024. <https://alec.org/model-policy/taiwan-friendship-caucus-resolution/>.
- American State Offices Association. n.d. "About ASOA, n.d., Accessed June 22, 2024. <https://www.asoataiwan.org/about-asoa>.
- Bartmann, Barry. 2006. "In or Out: Sub-National Island Jurisdictions and the Antechamber of Para-Diplomacy." *The Round Table* 95, no. 386: 541–59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00358530600929974>.
- Begert, Blanca. 2023. "Former California Gov. Jerry Brown on What's Changed with China, Politico, October 23, 2023, Accessed June 24, 2024. <https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/23/jerry-brown-china-newsom-climate-00123045>.
- Brown, Garrett Wallace, Iain McLean, and Alistair McMillan. 2018. *A Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics and International Relations*. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. <https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199670840.001.0001/acref-9780199670840-e-1672>.
- Castan Pinos, Jaume, and Jeremy Sacramento. 2024. "Sabotaging Paradiplomacy: A Typological Analysis of Counter-Paradiplomacy." *Ethnopolitics* 23, no. 2: 193–214. doi:10.1080/17449057.2022.2137290.
- Castan Pinos, Juame, and Jeremy Sacramento. 2019. "L'Etat Contre-Attaque: Un Examen de La Contra-Paradiplomatie Espagnole En Catalogne (2012–2017)." *Relations Internationales* 179, no. 3: 95–111. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3917/ri.179.0095>.
- Center for Asia-Pacific Resilience and Innovation. 2024. "Capri Annual Report 2023." <https://caprifoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/CAPRI-2023-Annual-Report.pdf>.
- Chen, Zhengyu. 2024. *Cai Yingwen Rang Taimei 'Lingyiwai' Huxin Xiao Meiqin: Lai Qingde You Nengli Rang Taiwan Gongxian Quyu*. Liberty Times, April 13, 2024, Accessed on June 23, 2024. <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4639983>.
- Cornago, Noe. 2018. "Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy." *The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy*, 1–8. <https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118885154.dipl0211>.
- Crapo, Mike. 2023. "Weekly Column: A Friend to Idaho, Taiwan Is Important Strategically and Economically: U.S. Senator Mike Crapo of Idaho." U.S. Senator Mike Crapo, July 31, 2023, Accessed June 23, 2024. <https://www.crapo.senate.gov/news/in-the-news/weekly-column-a-friend-to-idaho-taiwan-is-important-strategically-and-economically>.
- Czapiewski, Tomasz. 2015. "The (Para)Diplomacy of Scotland towards Asian Countries." *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego. Acta Politica* 31: 59–76. <https://doi.org/10.18276/ap.2015.31-04>.
- D&C Think-tank Minzhi Yanjiuyuan. 2019. 'Zhongbang Baogao' Meiguo Dui Hua Taidu Quanjing Zhouzhangpian. <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6779094-PRC-Think-Tank->

- Study-on-US-Governors-Attitudes.
- Diamond, Larry Jay, and Orville Schell, eds. 2019. *China's Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance: Report of the Working Group on Chinese Influence Activities in the United States*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
- Dominguez, Gabriel. 2024. "Will China Truly Be 'ready' to Invade Taiwan by 2027? It's Complicated." *The Japan Times*, April 3, 2024, Accessed on June 17, 2024. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2024/04/02/asia-pacific/politics/taiwan-us-china-2027-invasion/>.
- Duchacek, Ivo. 1986. *Territorial Dimension of Politics: Within, Among, and Across Nations*. 1st ed. Westview Press.
- Everington, Keoni. 2023. "Xi Denies 2027 Taiwan Invasion Plan, Lists Conditions for Attack." *Taiwan News*, November 16, 2023, Accessed June 14, 2024. <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/5041031>.
- Fry, Earl H. 2009. "The United States of America. Chapter. In *Foreign Relations in Federal Countries*, edited by Hans Michelmann, 296–323. McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Ganohariti, Ramesh, and Ernst Dijkhoorn. 2020. "Para- and Proto-Sports Diplomacy of Contested Territories: CONIFA as a Platform for Football Diplomacy." *The Hague Journal of Diplomacy* 15, no. 3: 329–54. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1871191x-bja10027>.
- Grano, Simona A. 2023. "'Letters to Taiwanese Compatriots': The PRC's Unification Ideology and Taiwanese Response in Cross-Strait Communication," *International Journal of Taiwan Studies* 7, 1: 37–64, doi: <https://doi.org/10.1163/24688800-20231275a>
- Green, Brendan Rittenhouse, and Caitlin Talmadge. 2022. "Then What? Assessing the Military Implications of Chinese Control of Taiwan." *International Security* 47 (1). One Broadway, 12th Floor, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142, USA: MIT Press: 7–45. doi:10.1162/isec_a_00437.
- Hadano, Tsukasa. 2022. "China Eyes 'Armed Unification' with Taiwan by 2027: Key Academic." *Nikkei Asia*, January 30, 2022. Accessed June 18, 2024. <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-eyes-armed-unification-with-Taiwan-by-2027-key-academic>.
- Hart, Brian, Bonnie Glaser, and Matthew Funairole. 2021. "China's 2027 Goal Marks the PLA's Centennial, Not an Expedited Military Modernization." *China Brief* Vol. 21, No. 6: 8–14. <https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-expedited-military-modernization/>.
- Hart, Melanie. 2025. "Melanie Hart Testifies to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on China's Malign Influence." *Atlantic Council*, January 31, 2025. Accessed on April 15, 2025. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/testimony/melanie-hart-testifies-to-the-senate-foreign-relations-committee-on-chinas-malign-influence/>.
- Hatzipanagos, Rachel. 2023. "Laws Banning Chinese from Buying Property Dredge Up Old History." *Washington Post*, August 21, 2023, Accessed June 25, 2024. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/08/18/florida-chinese-land-laws/>.
- Hosoya, Yuichi. 2019. "FOIP 2.0: The Evolution of Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy." *Asia-Pacific Review* 26, no. 1: 18–28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13439006.2019.1622868>.
- Hou, Betty. 2021. "Taiwan Voters Align with Government Positions in Referendum and Reject Ban on U.S. Pork." *The Japan Times*, December 19, 2021, Accessed June 23, 2024. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/12/19/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/taiwan-referendum-pork/>.
- Hsiao, Amanda. 2023. "Assessing the Implications of the Taiwanese President's Trip to the U.S." *International Crisis Group*, April 17, 2023, Accessed June 22, 2024. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/taiwan-strait/assessing-implications-taiwanese-presidents-trip-us>.
- Hu, Weixing. 2012. "Explaining Change and Stability in Cross-Strait Relations: A Punctuated Equilibrium Model," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 78, pp. 933–953.
- Huang, Christine, and Laura Clancy. 2023. "Taiwan Seen More Favorably than Not across 24

- Countries. Pew Research Center, August 11, 2023, Accessed June 20, 2024. <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/08/11/taiwan-seen-more-favorably-than-not-across-24-countries/>.
- Huang, Christine, Laura Silver, and Laura Clancy. 2024. "Americans Remain Critical of China." Pew Research Center, May 1, 2024, Accessed June 20, 2024. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/01/americans-remain-critical-of-china/>.
- Institute of China-America Studies (ICAS). 2023. "ICAS Bulletin, April 26, 2023." https://chinaus-icas.org/icas_bulletin/icas-bulletin-april-26-2023/.
- Jerzewski, Marcin. 2023. "Subnational Diplomacy: An Underutilized Instrument in Taiwan-CEE Ties." Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEIAS), March 25, 2023, Accessed April 15, 2024. <https://ceias.eu/taiwan-cee-subnational-diplomacy/>.
- Kim, Andrew Soohwan and Park Tae Gyun. 2023. "Expanding Horizons: Reciprocal Access Agreements, the Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership, and Japan's Novel Security Cooperation" *Journal of International and Area Studies* 30, no.2: 65-92. doi:10.23071/jias.2023.30.2.65
- Klabbers, Jan. 2023. *International Law*. 4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuznetsov, Alexander S. 2015. *Theory and Practice of Paradiplomacy: Subnational Governments in International Affairs*. S.l.: Routledge.
- Labrecque, Charles-Louis, and Scott Harrison. 2018. "Canadian Provinces and Foreign Policy in Asia." *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* 73, no. 3: 429-48. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702018791583>.
- Lecours, Andr. 2002. "Paradiplomacy: Reflections on the Foreign Policy and International Relations of Regions." *International Negotiation* 7, no. 1: 91-114. <https://doi.org/10.1163/157180602401262456>.
- Lee, Chaewon, and Adam P. Liff. 2022. "Reassessing Seoul's 'One China' Policy: South Korea-Taiwan 'Unofficial' Relations after 30 Years (1992-2022)." *Journal of Contemporary China* 32, no. 143: 745-64. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2113959>.
- Library of Congress. 2021. "H.R.4526 - 117th Congress (2021-2022): City and State Diplomacy Act." July 19, 2021, Accessed June 24, 2024. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4526>.
- Liu, Tianyang, and Yao Song. 2020. "Chinese Paradiplomacy: A Theoretical Review." *SAGE Open* 10, no. 1: 215824401989904. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244019899048>.
- Liu, Tzu-hsuan. 2024. "Mississippi, Connecticut Pass Taiwan Resolutions." Taipei Times, April 19, 2024, Accessed June 20, 2024. <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/04/20/2003816696>.
- Martin, Jonathan. 2023. "Jerry Brown Is Angry: Why Is America Barreling into a Cold War with China?" Politico, April 6, 2023, Accessed June 24, 2024. <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/04/06/jerry-brown-cold-war-america-china-00090730>.
- McHugh, James T. 2015. "Paradiplomacy, Protodiplomacy and the Foreign Policy Aspirations of Quebec and Other Canadian Provinces." *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 21, no. 3: 238-56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2015.1031261>.
- McMillan, Samuel Lucas. 2012. *The Involvement of State Governments in US Foreign Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McVicar, Daniel. 2023. "How the Czech Republic Became One of Taiwan's Closest European Partners and What It Means for EU-China Relations." Council on Foreign Relations, April 24, 2023, Accessed June 25, 2024. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-czech-republic-became-one-taiwans-closest-european-partners-and-what-it-means-eu-china>.
- Michigan House Republicans. 2024. "Michigan Must Reconsider CATL, Marshall Battery Plant in Light of Federal Probe." February 27, 2024, Accessed June 24, 2024. <https://gophouse.org/>

- posts/michigan-must-reconsider-catl-marshall-battery-plant-in-light-of-federal-probe.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2022. "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Remarks on the Visit to Taiwan by Governor of the US State of Indiana. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, August 22, 2022, Accessed June 21, 2024. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/202208/t20220822_10748766.html.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2023. "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson's Statement on Tsai Ing-Wen's 'Transit' Through the United States. April 6, 2023, Accessed June 25, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/202304/t20230406_11054882.html.
- Mohammed, Herish Khali, and Francis Owtram. 2014. "Paradiplomacy of Regional Governments in International Relations: The Foreign Relations of the Kurdistan Regional Government (2003 – 2010). *IRAN and the CAUCASUS* 18, no. 1: 65–84. <https://doi.org/10.1163/1573384x-20140106>.
- Mulligan, Stephen P. 2022. "Constitutional Limits on States' Power over Foreign Affairs. Congressional Research Service. <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10808>.
- National Governors Association. 2024. "Governors Urge Congress to Pass Legislation to Support U.S. Allies. April 19, 2024, Accessed June 21, 2024. <https://www.nga.org/news/press-releases/governors-urge-congress-to-pass-legislation-to-support-u-s-allies/>.
- Newland, Sara A. 2023. "Paradiplomacy as a Response to International Isolation: The Case of Taiwan. *The Pacific Review* 36, no. 4 (2023): 784–812. doi:10.1080/09512748.2022.2025889.
- Oddone, Nahuel. 2023. "Paradiplomacy. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.797>.
- Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. 2013. "California Opens Trade and Investment Office in China. April 11, 2013, Accessed June 22, 2024. <https://archive.gov.ca.gov/archive/gov39/2013/04/11/news17994/index.html>.
- Office of the President Republic of China Taiwan. 2008. "President Ma's Remarks at Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Concept and Strategy of the 'Flexible Diplomacy.' August 4, 2008, Accessed June 18, 2024. <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/2653>.
- Office of the President Republic of China Taiwan. 2013a. "President Ma Meets Delegation from US State of Arizona Led by Governor Janice K. Brewer. November 14, 2013, Accessed June 23, 2024. <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/4293?DeteailNo=governor>.
- Office of the President Republic of China Taiwan. 2013b. "President Ma Meets Delegation from US State of Wyoming Led by Governor Matt Mead. October 17, 2013, Accessed June 23, 2024. <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/4269?DeteailNo=governor>.
- Office of the President Republic of China Taiwan. 2023a. "President Tsai Meets Montana Governor Greg Gianforte. October 31, 2023, Accessed on June 23, 2024. <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6636?DeteailNo=governor>.
- Office of the President Republic of China Taiwan. 2023b. "President Tsai Meets New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy. October 20, 2023, Accessed on June 22, 2024. <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6629?DeteailNo=us+governor>.
- Office of the President Republic of China Taiwan. 2024a. "President Tsai Meets Delegation from Center for Asia-Pacific Resilience and Innovation. May 6, 2024, Accessed June 19, 2024. <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6713?DeteailNo=governor>.
- Office of the President Republic of China Taiwan. 2024b. "President Tsai Meets Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer. March 5, 2024, Accessed on June 22, 2024. <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6684?DeteailNo=us+governor>.
- Office of the President Republic of China Taiwan. 2025a. "President Lai Attends AmCham Taiwan 2025 Hsieh Nien Fan. March 20, 2025, Accessed on April 22, 2025. <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/6713?DeteailNo=governor>.

- gov.tw/News/6927.
- Office of the President Republic of China Taiwan. 2025b. "President Lai Meets Arizona Governor Katie Hobbs. March 18, 2025, Accessed on April 22, 2025. <https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6926>.
- Paquin, Stéphane. 2019. "Paradiplomacy. *Global Diplomacy*, 49–61. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28786-3_4.
- Perkins, Tom, and Amy Hawkins. 2024. "The China-Linked EV Battery Mega Factory Dividing a US Township. *The Guardian*, May 15, 2024, Accessed June 24, 2024. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/15/gotion-ev-battery-mega-factory-green-charter-township-michigan-china-electric-cars>.
- Pompeo, Michael R. 2020. "U.S. States and the China Competition - State.Gov. U.S. Department of State, February 8, 2020, Accessed June 17, 2024. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-states-and-the-china-competition>.
- Putz, Catherine. 2020. "A Discussion with US Senator Chris Murphy about Subnational Diplomacy and China. *The Diplomat*, September 9, 2020, Accessed June 20, 2024. <https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/a-discussion-with-us-senator-chris-murphy-about-subnational-diplomacy-and-china/>.
- Reid, Marshall. 2024. "A Different Level of Diplomacy: Taiwan's Growing Ties with US States. *Global Taiwan Institute*, March 20, 2024, Accessed June 15, 2024. <https://globaltaiwan.org/2024/03/a-different-level-of-diplomacy-taiwans-growing-ties-with-us-states/>.
- Schiavon, Jorge A. 2019. *Comparative Paradiplomacy*. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Schneider, Gregory S. 2023. "Youngkin Says He Blocked Ford Battery Plant on China Concerns - The Washington Post. *Washington Post*, January 13, 2023, Accessed June 22, 2024. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2023/01/13/youngkin-virginia-ford-battery-china/>.
- Schneider, Gregory S., and Laura Vozzella. 2023. "China Fuels Debate in Richmond after Youngkin Slams Door on Battery Plant. *Washington Post*, February 20, 2023, Accessed June 24, 2024. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2023/02/20/youngkin-china-virginia-ford/>.
- Setzer, Joana, and Karen Anderton. 2019. "Subnational Leaders and Diplomacy. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.504>.
- Shapiro, Don. 2023. "The Return of U.S. State Offices - Taiwan Business Topics. *Taiwan Business TOPICS (American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan)*, December 27, 2023, Accessed June 22, 2024. <https://topics.amcham.com.tw/2023/12/the-return-of-u-s-state-offices/>.
- Silver, Laura, Christine Huang, and Laura Clancy. 2022. "How Global Public Opinion of China Has Shifted in the Xi Era. *Pew Research Center*, September 28, 2022, Accessed June 21, 2024. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/09/28/how-global-public-opinion-of-china-has-shifted-in-the-xi-era/>.
- Silver, Laura, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang. 2020. "Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries. *Pew Research Center*, October 6, 2020, Accessed June 21, 2024. <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/>.
- Slocum, John W. 1999. "A Sovereign State within Russia? The External Relations of the Republic of Tatarstan. *Global Society* 13, no. 1: 49–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600829908443178>.
- Sullivan, Jonathan. 2024. "Time Matters in Cross-Strait Relations: Tsai Ing-Wen and Taiwan's Future. *The China Quarterly*, 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741023001649>.
- Summers, Juana. 2012. "Jon Huntsman's Mandarin Moments. *Politico*, January 14, 2012, Accessed June 22, 2024. <https://www.politico.com/story/2012/01/jon-huntsmans-mandarin-moments-071442>.

- Sutter, Karen M., John F. Sargent, and Manpreet Singh. 2023. "Semiconductors and the Chips Act: The Global Context. Congressional Research Service. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R47558.pdf>.
- Suzuki, Hiroyuki. 2021. "Building Resilient Global Supply Chains: The Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region. CSIS, February 19, 2021. Accessed April 10, 2025. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-resilient-global-supply-chains-geopolitics-indo-pacific-region>.
- Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Atlanta. 2023. "Unified Support of Taiwan from All Six Southeastern States. June 24, 2023, Accessed July 14, 2024. https://www.roc-taiwan.org/usatl_en/post/7306.html.
- Tavares, Rodrigo. 2016. *Paradiplomacy: Cities and States as Global Players*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- The State Council People's Republic of China. 2023. "Xi Meets U.S. California Governor. October 25, 2023, Accessed June 25, 2024. https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202310/25/content_WS65391bc5c6d0868f4e8e0a76.html.
- Toh, Michelle. 2023. 'Divorce Is Not an Option' for US and China, Newsom Says after Xi Meeting. CNN Business, October 26, 2023, Accessed June 24, 2024. <https://edition.cnn.com/newsom-xi-meeting-us-china-intl-hnk/index.html>.
- Tubilewicz, Czeslaw, and Natalie Omond. 2021. *The United States' Subnational Relations with Divided China: A Constructivist Approach to Paradiplomacy*. London: Routledge.
- U.S. Department of State. 2024. The Subnational Diplomacy Unit Functional Bureau Strategy. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/FBS_SDU_07JUNE2024_public-version.pdf.
- Xi, Jinping. 2019. *Zai 'Gaotaiwantongbaoshu' fabiao sishi zhounian jinianhui shang de jianghua*. People's Daily, January 2, 2019, Accessed June 15, 2024. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2019/0102/c64094-30499664.html>.
- Xin, Qiang. 2020. "Selective Engagement: Mainland China's Dual-Track Taiwan Policy," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 29, No. 124, 535-552.
- Yan, Flora. 2022. "China-US Subnational Exchanges under the Biden Administration. The Diplomat, January 4, 2022, Accessed June 19, 2024. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/china-us-subnational-exchanges-under-the-biden-administration/>.
- Yen, Hope. 2023. "CIA Chief: China Has Some Doubt on Ability to Invade Taiwan. AP News, February 26, 2023, Accessed June 16, 2024. <https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-taiwan-politics-united-states-government-eaf869eb617c6c356b2708607ed15759#>.
- Zhang, Baohui. 2011. "Taiwan's New Grand Strategy," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 20, No. 69, pp. 269-285.